Information-Centric Networking (ICN) is an emerging networking technology that has been designed to directly operate on named content/information objects, rather than relying on the knowledge of the content location. According to the ICN principles, a user requests the information object by its name or some other form of object identifier. After that, the ICN system is responsible for finding the particular object and sending it back to the user. Finally, we investigate the attack probability for various system and network parameters, such as the number of hash functions, the BF maximum fill factor, and the number of hops toward the victim node.
Introduction
In conventional IP networks, such as the Internet, the communication between network nodes is done through the location identifiers. For example, the host IP address serves as a suitable identifier. A number of recent works show that this communication approach is not able to cope with the requirements of modern services and applications [19, 26, 28] . Among others, challenging areas that are of particular interest in the research community in- clude the host mobility, multicast and multisource content delivery, and security. With regard to the multisource communication, assume that the same information object is hosted at two different sources (that is, two nodes with different IP addresses). In this case, the network layer does not possess sufficient information in order to ensure efficient object delivery by selecting, for example the best source or by enabling the delivery of parts of the object from both sources. This problem of selecting the best source must be addressed at a higher layer, a fact that causes unnecessary delays and inefficiencies.
As an attempt to address the above mentioned issues, the information-centric networking (ICN) technology made its appearance in the last years [1, 18, 61] . ICN shifts the focus from the location of object to the information object itself. A user can request the object by its name (or other unique identifier) and the network is responsible for finding the requested object and delivering it to the requesting user. In practice, this is achieved by making the network routers content-aware. That is, the routers forward the information objects using object names, rather than the IP addresses.
A number of ICN research and development (R&D) projects, both in the United States and Europe, have been completed in the last years [61] . Also, new ICN projects have recently started [37, 40, 54] . Among these ICN efforts, especially at their early stage, many adopted revolutionary approaches and envisioned replacing completely the current IP-based communication paradigm and infrastructure. On the other hand, other ICN proposals adopt the evolutionary path that aims at co-existing with IP networks and improving their limitations [37] , or at exploiting new opportunities brought by the ICN concept [40, 54] .
With regard to the proposed packet forwarding mechanisms in ICN, they can be broadly classified into stateful [12, 58, 63] , stateless [29, 49] , and semi-stateless [52] .
One example of ICN architecture that uses a stateful forwarding mechanism is the named data networking (NDN) [65] . According to this approach, routers keep soft states for the pending content requests/interests. To avoid memory overflows, solutions based on hash tables and Bloom filters (BFs) [35, 51] have been proposed for NDN. On the other hand, the line speed publish/subscribe internetworking (LIPSIN) mechanism [29] , currently used in the PURSUIT ICN [20, 38] , encodes the delivery tree in the packet header in the form of a BF. This approach essentially eliminates the need for soft states at the routers. However, some scalability issues arise in terms of supported network size and the required packet header size [6] .
Although ICN is an emerging technology, it already shows some promising results in the areas of efficient content delivery [44, 49, 56, 60] , host mobility [9, 53, 55] , smart grids [14, 27, 31] , satellite networks [16, 33, 43] , and network security [5, 21, 22] . On the other hand, there are not many works that investigate the applicability of ICN principles in wireless community networks (WCN).
The latter have recently made their appearance and are of particular research interest due to challenging and unpredictable network conditions [23, 34] . In our previous paper [59] we studied the scalability of the ICN approach in WCNs. In this work, we extend the scalability study and also focus on the security aspects of ICN-enabled solutions for WCNs. With regard to the security aspects, we focus on the distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, which attempt to make the offered network services or resources unavailable to end users [11] . To achieve this, attackers use a variety of techniques that consume network or system resources, thus interrupting access for legitimate users. In particular, we investigate the DDoS attack probability for various system and network parameters, such as the number of hash functions, the BF maximum fill factor, and the number of hops toward the victim node. As it is shown, an attacker may exploit the unique features of BF-based packet forwarding to target any node We also study the problem of integrating the ICN technology with existing non-ICN networks, identify the limitations of current ICN solutions and propose appropriate enhancements. In particular, we are concerned with the problem of strategically deploying ICN infrastructure to improve the performance of WCNs from both operator's and user's perspective. To this end, and in order to enable cost-efficient solutions, we study the scalability of ICN content dissemination mechanisms in heterogeneous network environments, identify their limitations, and propose appropriate enhancements.
Scalability of stateful ICN forwarding mechanisms has been studied in a number of works [17, 64] . In this work, we focus on stateless ICN content dissemination. We first evaluate the LIPSIN mechanism, as one good representative for the stateless ICN approach, and reveal its scalability limitations in terms of supported network size. One of the factors that limits the scalability of this mechanism is its dependence on a single Bloom filter to encode the whole delivery path/tree. In the following, this is referred to as single-stage Bloom filter (SS-BF) approach. Next, we present an enhanced content dissemination mechanism that flexibly uses multi-stage Bloom filters (MS-BF) [47] to achieve good scalability. Hence, this approach can be seen as a generalisation of the basic LIPSIN mechanism. This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we review the related works on content dissemination, scalability, and security in ICN. In Section 3, we propose an ICN architecture for WCNs and describe the network elements. In Section 4, we describe the main ICN functions and map them to the network elements. In Section 5, we describe the realisation of BF-based content dissemination in our proposed network architecture. In particular, Subsection 5.1 describes the SS-BF based content delivery, whereas Subsection 5.2 describes the MS-BF based approach. In Section 6, we determine the DDoS attack probability and provide results for a number of realistic networking scenarios. We conclude and discuss our future work in Section 7. Also, in Table 1 we present the list of abbreviations used in the paper.
Related Work
In this section, we briefly review some studies and solutions proposed to address the scalability and security challenges in ICN.
In [64] , the basic principles for a scalable NDN forwarding plane are presented. The proposed design includes exact string matching with fast lookup and longest prefix matching for variable-length and unbounded content names. This can be achieved by simplifying the data structures and operational flows of the basic CCNx prototype [15] . However, an extensive scalability study is left for future work.
In [32] , the architectural ICN scalability is studied from the viewpoint of content naming and user mobility. In this work, the NDN architectural framework is considered.
The name resolution and mobility problems are efficiently addressed via keyword-based interest packets. Largescale simulation experiments for real Internet topologies show good scalability of the proposed approach.
In [24] , the scalability of the NDN Forwarding Information Base (FIB), which is used for content discovery, In [36] , the problem of scalable and loop-free routing in NDN is studied. The proposed approach eliminates the need for per-packet in-network states, which are the main source for scalability limitations. This is achieved through a tag-based content address aggregation. The scalability evaluation in terms of storage and computational complexity is performed for realistic autonomous system (AS)-level topologies and for traces of popular applications.
In [46] , a large-scale trace-driven analysis of ICN caching algorithms is performed. This study focuses on video-on-demand workloads and evaluates both networkcentric and user-centric performance metrics for a wide range of content placement/replacement strategies and cache sizes.
A number of works tackle the scalability of ICN routing and forwarding functions by encoding the delivery path/tree in the packet header in the form of a BF. In [62] , the LIPSIN mechanism of [29] has been extended using the MS-BF approach of [47] . The idea is to divide the content delivery path/tree into a number of stages and to encode the links of each stage into a separate BF. The benefit in terms of scalability comes from the possibility to individually optimize the size of the BF in each stage.
An optimization framework targeting the elimination of false positives of the MS-BF forwarding mechanism is presented in [48] . Simulation and measurement results show reduced packet header sizes compared to LIPSIN as well as false-positive-free operation.
With regard to the security issues, a number of works has shown that the BF based forwarding in ICN can be subject to new types of DDoS attacks [8, 41] . One possible attack scenario can be achieved by exploiting the forwarding function. In [2, 41] , it has been shown that the LIPSIN mechanism is vulnerable to replay attacks which may lead to DDoS. Therefore, the Z-formation technique has been introduced to offer a DDoS resistant forwarding.
In [6] , the Z-formation technique has been analyzed in terms of the scalability of the topology management function. In [3] , the works of [41] and [2] have been extended to prevent brute-force attacks on the LIPSIN mechanism.
The work of [3] has been further improved in [4] and [5] , where optimal BF fill factors and BF header lengths for reducing the DDoS attack probability are determined.
As discussed above, most of the existing ICN scalability studies either focus on very specific aspects, such as mobility, caching, and video delivery, or are based on small-scale evaluation scenarios. Also, most of the proposed solutions assume a relatively stable network infrastructure and do not take into account the peculiarities of networks with challenged conditions. On the contrary, our work targets a holistic evaluation and addresses the scalability problem of challenged and unpredictable environments of community networks.
Network Architecture and Components
In this section, we describe our proposed ICN-based architecture for WCNs. The basic components of this architecture are shown in Fig. 1 and described below.
• • Broker Node (BN): This is a special purpose ICNenabled node that is owned by the WCNO and is responsible for content resolution and inter-domain content forwarding. A BN can be a built-in node or a user-defined node.
• Edge Gateway (E-GW): A node that is owned by the WCNO and is responsible for connecting to other domains and to external networks (e.g., the Internet). An E-GW can also be configured to provide other network services, such as dynamic host configuration protocol (DHCP), firewall, network address translation (NAT), static routing, virtual private network (VPN), and load balancing.
• Service Execution Gateway (SE-GW): A specialpurpose node that acts as the attachment point for non-ICN UEs that wish to access ICN services. A SE-GW is owned by the WCNO and is responsible 
Content Resolution Function (CRF)
The CRF is responsible for receiving the requests for a particular content from subscribers/requestors (i.e., UEs) and for locating one or more content publishers/sources (e.g., UE or a content server). It is also responsible for matching publishers and subscribers for a particular content item. The selection of appropriate content sources could be based on a number of factors, such as the distance or the current load [30] . We assume that the CRF is aware of the content location either via explicit notifications from content sources (i.e., according to ICN principles) or via a traditional IP-based approach (i.e., acting as an IP gateway). CRF's role is similar, e.g., to the role of the Rendezvous Node in PURSUIT ICN [20] .
Resource Management Function (RMF)
The RMF is responsible for the management of communication, computing, and storage resources. Also, it takes decisions for constructing the content delivery path/tree and for content caching [66] . In particular, it is responsible for efficient allocation of network resources to particular data flows when requested by the CRF. We assume that the RMF is aware of the network topology and other useful information, such as, the characteristics of the com- 
Content Dissemination Function (CDF)
The CDF is responsible for disseminating the requested content to UEs. This is performed by forwarding the content to appropriate outgoing links, as specified by the FId (details later in Section 5.2) That is, the CDF is responsible for forwarding the content to the next-hop node.
The forwarding decision is based on soft states [56, 63] or on in-packet information [29] . Furthermore, more advanced techniques, such as hash-routing can also be supported [45] .
Border Gateway Function (BGF)
The BGF is responsible for connecting to non-ICN networks and, therefore, is located at E-GWs. The implementation of such function is outside the scope of this work. However, there have been research activities, which already show very promising results in this direction [37] .
The idea is to use the IP addresses, which can be subscribed to using ICN primitives, and, as a consequence, would enable running IP flows over ICN infrastructure.
Hence, and in order to avoid duplicating the existing research efforts, we assume that such a function is available.
Network Attachment Function (NAF)
The NAF is responsible for translating the non-ICN compatible requests (e.g., IP requests) into ICN requests and vice versa. Similarly to BGF, the design of NAF is outside the scope of this work and will be covered by the research activities of the POINT project [37] .
Bloom Filter Based Content Dissemination
In this section, we describe the basic principles of the tra- [47] . In the following, the traditional BF is referred to as the SS-BF.
Single-stage Bloom filter (SS-BF)
An example of the SS-BF based packet forwarding is shown in Fig. 2 . Consider three UEs (Bob, Alice, and Eve) and three FNs (FN-1, FN-2, and FN-3), connected as shown in Fig. 2 . Each link has been assigned a unique m-bit Link Identifier (LId). For illustration purposes we use m = 8. In practice, m is usually much larger, e.g. m = 248 [29] . Assume that Alice has subscribed to some content object that is available from Bob. In order to deliver the content object to the desired destination, the delivery path from the publisher (i.e., Bob) to the subscriber (i.e., Alice) must be encoded into a BF. This BF encoded path will be used to forward packets and is referred to as the FId.
In the following, we describe: a) how to construct the An important shortcoming of the BF based forwarding is the possibility of false positives [10, 13] . That is, there is some probability that the packet will be forwarded via a link that was not intended to be included during the FId creation. For example, assume that in Fig. 2 we have LId-3 =00110000. Since this link is not part of the delivery path from Bob to Alice, the constructed FId will be still the same as shown in Fig. 2 . However, the forwarding test at FN-1 for LID-3 will give a (false-) positive result, and therefore a copy of the packet will also be forwarded to FN-3. False positives must be kept at low levels so that the network bandwidth can be efficiently utilized and to avoid various anomalies, such as the forwarding loops and packet storms [8, 42] .
Note that, according to the FId construction method described above, the whole delivery path is encoded into a single BF. Hence, we refer to this approach as the SS-BF based packet forwarding. 
Multi-stage Bloom filter (MS-BF)
Recent studies have shown that the SS-BF based forwarding has some scalability limitations in terms of the number of supported links [6] . In particular, when the number of links is above 25-30, the probability of false positives becomes too high. This may severely degrade the network performance or even cause security problems [4, 42] .
Therefore, we adopt the MS-BF based content dissemination approach. The idea is to divide the delivery path/tree into a number of stages. Links belonging to each stage will be encoded into a SS-BF, as described in Sec- Hence, it will be harder for a malicious UE to employ reverse engineering techniques for launching DDoS attacks [3, 57] . Another advantage of the MS-BF based approach is that the stage selection can be guided by a wide range of network-and user-centric metrics, such as topology characteristics, spatial and temporal traffic demand, user device types and energy status.
Calculating DDoS Attack Success Probability
In this section we first describe how the BF based content dissemination can be used to launch a DDoS attack in ICN. Next, we calculate the probability of a DDoS attack and provide results for various network-centric and system-centric parameters. We assume that the LIds of the outgoing links are constructed as follows. There must be A possible attack strategy is where an attacker tries to guess the BF towards the victim node (i.e., UE) by trying all possible BFs. This strategy is referred to as the bruteforce attack. Once a suitable BF is found, an attacker may launch a DDoS attack by using a botnet.
In particular, the attacker creates and sends random BFs with maximum fill factor, ρ max . The fill factor, ρ, refers to the number, s, of bits that are set to 1 over the total number of bits, m, in the BF:
Note that, based on the above definition of ρ, it holds 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1.
Let us denote by P attack the attack probability using a single packet. That is, the probability that one randomly created BF by an attacker can reach (i.e., pass all the forwarding tests along the path) the victim node. Based on the description of the forwarding test above, an attacker in order to maximize the attack probability, will use ρ = ρ max . This is a direct consequence of the properties of the AND operation, since the probability that BF AN D LId = LId is higher when the BF has more bits set to 1. As a consequence, when the fill factor in the BF increases, then the probability of passing the forwarding test also increases.
In an extreme case where ρ max = 1 (i.e., all bits of the BF can be set to 1), such a BF would pass all the forwarding tests and would reach every node in the network. This would effectively implement a broadcast service. In order to prevent the misuse of this feature, the maximum fill factor must be set to a smaller value, e.g., ρ max = 0.5 [4, 41] .
In order to determine P attack , let us first calculate the probability that a random BF will pass a single forwarding test. For this to happen, for each bit position that is set to 1 in the LId there must be the same bit position set to 1 in the BF (due to the AND operation of the forwarding test).
Note that in the LId the maximum number of bits set to 1 is equal to the number of hash functions, k, since each bit is set by one hash function. Hence, the probability of passing a single forwarding test can be calculated by:
Since, as was mentioned, an attacker will use ρ = ρ max , we have:
If the victim node is h hops away, then h forwarding tests must be passed in order for the packet to reach this node. Assuming that the P f t 's of different links are independent, the attack probability using a single packet can be determined via:
The probability of (4) refers to the probability that a single packet can reach the victim node that is h hops away. In Fig. 4 we present the attack probability ver- Fig. 4 show that when the number, k, of hash functions increases, the attack probability decreases. We also observe that for realistic values of the aforementioned parameters, the attack probability using a single packet is very low. For example, when h = 3 and k = 4, then P attack < 10 −3 . On the other hand, when h = 6 and k = 5, then P attack < 10 −9 .
In Fig. 5 we present the attack probability using a single packet versus different BF maximum fill factors, ρ max , for different numbers of hops, h, toward the victim. In particular, we increase ρ max from 0.3 to 0.6 in steps of 0.05, and use h = 1, ..., 8. We observe that the attack probability can be substantially reduced by reducing ρ max . For example, when h = 4, reducing ρ max from 0.55 to 0.3 causes P attack reduction from 10 −3 to less than 10 −6 . However, as it has been shown in [4] , when ρ max is too low, then the BF is not able to encode long network paths (i.e., a large number of LIds). Hence, an optimal selection of ρ max is important in order to guarantee that a sufficient number of links can be encoded into the BF. The attack probability using a single packet, P attack , versus the maximum fill factor, ρ max , for different numbers of hops, h.
In the following we determine how many packets, x, are required to be sent by an attacker in order to guarantee a certain attack success probability, denoted by P success (x). This probability can be determined as follows:
Note that P success (x) is a strictly increasing function of x, with P success (0) = 0 and P success (1) = P attack .
In Fig. 6 we present the attack success probability, P success (x), versus the number of transmitted packets, x.
As shown in the horizontal axis of 6, we start with x = 500 and increase the number of packets up to x = 10500 in steps of 1000. We consider different numbers of hops, h = 3, 4, and 5, from the attacking node toward the victim node. We also consider different BF maximum fill factors, ρ max = 0.5, 0.55, and 0.6. In particular: i) for h = 3 we use ρ max = 0.5; ii) for h = 4 we use ρ max = 0.5 and 0.55; iii) for h = 5 we use ρ max = 0.5, 0.55, and 0.6.
In Fig. 6 we observe that in the case that h = 3 the attack success probability, P success , is higher compared to the other cases even if the maximum fill factor, ρ max , has its lowest value: ρ max = 0.5. When h = 4, P success However, when ρ max increases to 0.55, then P success for h = 5 becomes higher compared ti the case when h = 4
and ρ max = 0.5. We also observe that for a victim that is 3 hops away, P success is very high even when the number of transmitted packets is small. For example, when x = 500 packets and ρ max = 0.5, then P success > 0.6. On the other hand, if the victim is 5 hops away and ρ max = 0.5, then P success < 0.2 even when the number of transmitted packets is x > 10000.
Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we propose an ICN based architecture for wireless community networks. Initially, we describe the basic network elements and functions. Next, we present two content dissemination techniques based on Bloom filters (BFs). According to the SS-BF based technique, the whole delivery path/tree is encoded into a single BF. This approach has been shown to suffer from scalability and security problems. On the contrary, the MS-BF based technique divides the delivery path/tree into a number of stages and the links of each stage are encoded into different BFs. This approach has better scalability charac- We determine the DDoS attack probability and show results for various network-centric and system-centric parameters. In our future work we plan to study the problem of joint optimization of BF lengths in each stage of the MS-BF.
